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Celebrity as a Political Resource: The Human Rights Now! Campaign 
By 
Charles P. Henry 
University of California at Berkeley 
 
“Introduction” 
 Thirty years ago Amnesty International (AI) launched its most ambitious and 
innovative human rights campaign ever.  Through the medium of celebrity rock 
musicians, the Human Rights Now! (HRN) tour took the message of global human rights 
to 15 countries in 20 concerts spread over six weeks with a total audience of one million 
people (See Appendix 1).  An estimated one billion people in over sixty countries 
watched a three-hour broadcast on December 10, 1988, Human Rights Day.1   
Commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) the campaign had five major objectives.  First, to show that people everywhere 
support human rights.  Second, to protect people in all countries who are working for 
human rights.  Third, to get governments to commit themselves to be legally bound to 
respect human rights.  Fourth, to promote human rights education.  And finally, to 
directly impact the cases of five AI “prisoners of conscience (POCS).”2  This 
retrospective examination of the tour from an insider’s perspective3 seeks to answer 
several questions.  How did the idea for the tour arise and how did the campaign change 
the culture of AI?  Was the tour successful in its general goal of essentially building a 
global civil society for human rights and its more specific goal of releasing political 
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prisoners?  What are the consequences of using celebrities as spokespersons for human 
rights victims and have they changed over the last three decades? 
 Michael Lipsky’s seminal article, “Protest as a Political Resource” serves as a 
theoretical framework for analyzing the HRN! Campaign.  Devised to look at political 
protest in the sixties, Lipsky presents the problem as one of “bargaining” and asks the 
question how can protesters without the traditional political resources of money and 
influence impact or change political behavior?  He suggests that the negative political 
resources of “naming and shaming” can force target groups to the bargaining table.  For 
this process to happen protest leaders have to successfully negotiate four groups or 
elements.  The protest leader(s) must convince their own group of the utility of the protest 
action.  Next they must attract communications media that will gain the attention of those 
with traditional political resources.  This latter constituency, which Lipsky labels 
“reference publics” or “third parties”, must be motivated to act on the information or 
message in a way that influences the last group—the protest target.4  All four of these 
elements were central to the HRN! Campaign. 
 
“The Protest Organization” 
 In several key ways the HRN! Tour was a fundamental challenge to AI’s culture 
and operating procedures.  This challenge produced conflict between and within AI’s 
national sections (and groups in countries without sections), the International Secretariat 
(IS), the International Executive Committee (IEC), and the biannual International Council 
Meetings (ICMs).  As the largest transnational human rights network and second oldest 
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grassroots non-governmental organization (NGO), the HRN! Tour is a rare look at how 
the process works.   
 On December 1, 1986, AIUSA’s Executive Director, John (Jack) Healey 
presented a proposal for a world human rights rock tour to the Board of Directors with a 
copy to the IEC and IS.  The idea for a world tour grew from the successful completion 
of the “Conspiracy of Hope” tour in the summer of 1986.  Healey, with the vital 
assistance of rock promoter Bill Graham put together a tour with U2, Sting, Peter Gabriel 
and others that visited six U. S. cities and culminated in a daylong concert at Giants 
stadium in New Jersey and broadcast on MTV.  While the specific target of the concerts 
was the release of six AI prisoners of conscience, the larger goal was to take AI’s human 
rights message to a larger and younger audience.  At each stop, audiences were 
encouraged to write letters for POCs and join AI.  The tour raised over $2.6 million 
dollars for the section and added 100,000 new members.5   
 The IEC was well aware of AIUSA’s success when it was presented with the 
world tour proposal in late December of 1986.  However, no non-governmental 
organization had attempted a project as complex, lengthy and costly as a world rock tour 
for human rights or any other humanitarian cause.  AIUSA had approved the proposal 
and agreed to provide start-up funds.  The IEC appointed a Working Group (WG) 
composed of members from AI sections in the United Kingdom, Norway and the U.S. to 
look at the feasibility of the tour.  At its March 1988 meeting the IEC suggested changes 
to the WG and revised its guidelines on fundraising.  At its June meeting the IEC gave 
the go ahead to the project creating a Policy Committee (PC) composed of two IEC 
members and IS staff to facilitate quick policy decisions on tour business.  Crucially, the 
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operation of the tour was given to a separate company composed largely of a few AIUSA 
staff headed by Healey to reduce any liability for the international movement.  A contract 
was signed between the company, Concerts for Human Rights Foundation, and AI, with 
the provision that no AI funds would be used in the production of the tour. 
 Despite the IEC’s approval in June 1987, the tour project would raise a number of 
concerns throughout the movement until the concerts concluded in October 1988.  Three 
issues would emerge that would ultimately change the culture of the organization.  The 
first issue was who speaks for AI?  Although AI is by far the largest grassroots human 
right organization, this question had never really been seen as a problem.  IS researchers 
produced prisoner cases that were adopted by AI groups.  These groups pressured 
governments to release POCs, prevent torture, and prohibit the death penalty.  This 
narrow set of human rights concerns was clearly defined with IS researchers playing a 
crucial role in selecting cases and distributing information and guidelines to movement 
activists.  Activists got to know something about AI prisoners and their families and only 
people actually involved in letter writing were considered members.6 
 The intensive research culture relying on moral suasion to influence governments 
was now challenged by a proposed global campaign that would take key decisions away 
from IS researchers and place them in the hands of sections holding concerts, a private 
corporation, musicians and others.  AI’s ultimate policy-making body is the ICM held 
every two years in which all sections send delegates to debate resolutions that set policy 
for the movement.  In the period between ICMs, the IEC composed of elected section 
members meets on a regular bases to implement policy and oversee the operation of the 
IS.  The IS, based in London, is composed of professional staff serving primarily in three 
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areas: research, campaigns and membership, and legal.  It seemed clear from the outset 
that AI’s traditional hierarchy would be inadequate to support a global rock tour.  The 
IEC quickly decided that the project could not disrupt the ongoing work of the IS and 
sections although this decision ultimately proved unrealistic.  It also became apparent that 
the IEC could not move quickly enough to make the daily decisions required by the 
project, hence the formation of the Policy Committee to work closely with tour 
organizers. 
 While the PC and the concert organization worked in close contact, they left 
unresolved the question of who spoke for the movement.  What was a fundamental policy 
decision and could the PC or even the IEC resolve it?  Who would choose the concert 
sites and what role would the sections in these sites play?  How would the tour be 
financed and who would benefit from any tour surplus?  The resolution of these questions 
would create conflict and division within the movement. 
 The first conflict was between the national sections and the IS.  Most medium and 
small sections favored the tour.  The larger sections urged caution but did not oppose the 
project.  The Netherlands, Finland and Greece were against the tour at the outset but the 
first two eventually came around.  The IS was reluctant for several reasons.  It was the 
first effort to decentralize a major project outside the IS.  As a result there was little 
integration of the project with the IS’s ongoing work and there was concern that the IS 
lacked the capacity to follow-up on the campaign.7  Crucially, the fact that it was a global 
campaign that was decentralized to the sections challenged the pre-eminent position of 
researchers in the IS.  While they were consulted on where the concerts should go their 
word was not final.   
 6 
 For example, AI’s Indian section and the PC were strongly committed to having a 
concert in India, primarily for development reasons.  However, the section had also 
warned that because of AI’s research concerns and strained relationship with the Indian 
government, an AI association with the concert would be problematic.  Although the 
concert organization had no promoter in India, they identified The Times of India 
newspaper as a local underwriter.  The newspaper also insisted that AI could not be 
identified with the concert.  That prohibition and a host of other local problems including 
security led the concert organization to recommend canceling the tour stop in India.  
Despite this negative recommendation and its own rules governing the concerts, the IS 
and IEC representatives insisted on going ahead with the event.  In the end it was only the 
artists on the stage who were permitted to communicate AI’s message.8  This radical 
decentering of AI’s research concerns as well as AI’s control over its message 
represented a sharp break with AI’s culture. 
 A second major break with AI tradition occurred around fundraising for the 
concerts.  The project proposal from AIUSA, unlike previous major rock events such as 
Live Aid and the Secret Policemen’s Ball 9, was revenue neutral.  That is, it was not seen 
as a fundraising effort by AI but rather a global human rights education project.  The 
artists approached by Healey and Graham were not interested in simply doing a series of 
concerts in venues in the West that they frequently played in.  They were attracted to 
taking both their music and AI’s message to countries that rarely if ever had an 
opportunity to hear them.  To do this, however, it was necessary to hold concerts in 
Europe and North America that would generate enough revenue to underwrite concerts in 
the Global South.  Some 29 AI sections/groups asked to be considered as potential 
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concert sites.10  Thus the problem was to find the right balance of revenue generating 
sites in the West to offset the loss of revenue in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
 The IEC approved the tour proposal on the condition that no AI resources would 
be diverted to support the project.  Aside from the initial seed funds from AIUSA, the 
concert foundation found it extremely difficult to raise private start-up funds.  In large 
part this was due to the stringent fundraising guidelines imposed on the tour organizers.  
AI prohibited the use of funds from its international budget and through the PC refused to 
accept any financial liability for the concert tour.  And while permitting the concert 
foundation to solicit individual and corporate donations it strictly limited the use of AI’s 
name in conjunction with corporate sponsors.  While these guidelines were consistent 
with AI culture, they made fundraising problematic.11 
 By the summer of 1987, it was clear that the tour would need at least two million 
dollars in underwriting and an additional eight million to cover potential liability.  In the 
fall, the concert foundation requested a $250,000 loan from AIUSA to keep the project 
viable.  Finally, in early 1988 a deal was worked out with the sportswear company 
Reebok for ten million in financing.  After some initial concerns over Reebok’s business 
practices, some mistakenly associated the company’s name with South Africa’s 
Springbok rugby team, a contract was signed.  Reebok found it extremely frustrating 
dealing with AI and formed a separate entity to fund the tour.  For example, they wanted 
to include a copy of the UDHR and concert information in every box of shoes they sold.  
This idea was rejected, as was the suggestion that Reebok have a banner on the concert 
stage.  Rather than being seen as a partner in the tour, Reebok was consigned to a minor 
role being mentioned at the end of the printed program.  The company was never certain 
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whether they were dealing with the foundation or AI and the constant back and forth 
between the PC, concert foundation and Reebok caused a number of delays. 
 The Reebok deal highlighted the issue of who speaks for AI in other ways.  
AIUSA, for example, was happy to work with the corporation in promoting AI 
membership.  The French section of AI, however, wanted nothing to do with Reebok.  
Some sections where the concerts were to be held wanted to sell concert T-shirts and 
other merchandise to raise funds.  Reebok and the concert foundation, however, had 
agreed that they would produce the official merchandise to underwrite the cost of the 
tour.  The question of who represents AI would arise in a more fundamental way in the 
selection of concert sites. 
 As AI’s first truly decentralized project, a number of issues arose that had never 
been encountered before.  At the outset, the concert foundation discovered that U. S. tax 
laws prevented it or AI from lobbying for any particular treaty or for any specific 
government position.  Therefore the Human Rights Now! Campaign would be limited in 
terms of the governmental pressure it could apply.  Another issue at the outset was the 
use of a rock tour as a vehicle to promote human rights outside the West.  Some within 
the IS and certain sections objected to the image the concerts would project in the Global 
South.  Tour organizers sought to counter this criticism by including local musicians at 
each venue.   
 
“Communications/Media” 
 A more fundamental issue was the role of sections in promoting and participating 
in concerts in their own countries.  While AI had historically communicated a coherent 
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message from its leadership in London, it now faced a situation in which country context 
would play a role in communication.  In Europe, a problem arose over countries in which 
certain artists had planned their own tours.  To eliminate competing with themselves, a 
proposed concert(s) in Scandinavia was withdrawn while another in Spain was moved 
from Madrid to Barcelona.  Both of these actions created a great deal of conflict in the 
sections involved.  In Canada the section insisted on one concert in Toronto and one 
concert in Montreal even though Toronto’s venue was too small and would produce little 
surplus revenue. 
  In Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America political concerns were 
predominant.  In some countries in which AI had human rights concerns, it was clear that 
a concert could proceed only if AI’s participation was invisible.  Thus the concert 
foundation was front and center although AI development might have been a primary 
goal.  At the other extreme, government officials in some countries sought to be on stage 
or at the press conference to associate their name with the event.  In Argentina, for 
example, the IEC had invited President Alfonsin to the concert without informing the 
section although many members there were opposed.12 
 Another conflict in the U. S. highlighted AI’s lack of flexibility concerning its 
mandate.  When the tour reached San Francisco the tour production staff learned the hotel 
they had booked was being by union organizers for unfair labor practices.  When the IEC 
was consulted their position was “AI takes no position on strikes.”13  This neutrality did 
not sit well with either the section or the musicians.  The tour organizers made a last 
minute decision to book another hotel leaving open the question of whether the section or 
IEC represents AI. 
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 Although tour director Jack Healey said more than once that dealing with the 
artists managers and rock promoters was worse than dealing with political dictators, the 
artists were probably the cause of fewer headaches than any other element of the 
campaign.  Certainly there were conflicts involving egos and musical tastes.  For 
example, certain artists did not want “soft rockers” or folk artists on the tour.14  And 
there was a predictable battle over who would open or close the show.  However, all the 
musicians were on point when it came to delivering AI’s message.  Sting, Peter Gabriel 
and U2 were longtime AI members and supporters and the other artists, including Bruce 
Springsteen, quickly picked up the message.  During the press conferences at each tour 
stop, in personal interviews and on the stage itself, the artists called attention to human 
rights generally and to specific local situations of concern to AI. 
 While more commonplace today through social media, the Human Rights Now! 
Tour was unprecedented in the status and number of artists speaking out on current issues 
across the globe.  Predictably, the media loved it.  According to Lipsky’s model, protest 
leaders must somehow convince the media that their protest is newsworthy.  That need to 
attract attention occasionally led protesters to consider innovative and even dangerous 
actions in order to attract attention.  During a 1980s campaign on human rights abuses in 
Sri Lanka, for example, the absence of media interest caused the U. S. section to rent 
billboards on main highways leading to the U. S. Capitol in hopes of attracting the 
attention of commuting legislators. 
 Celebrities solve the problem of media attention and the fact that they are 
speaking about something other than their music adds an element of unpredictability.  
Human rights leaders, who share the spotlight with the artists, become minor celebrities 
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themselves.   Healey, for example, was selected as “Person of the Week” on the ABC 
evening news that did a mini biography of his life.  IEC chairperson Franca Sciuto, who 
accompanied the tour, saw the Italian section benefit greatly from a single television 
program.  The producers of a popular Italian show called Fantastics wanted Peter Gabriel 
or Sting to appear on the show prior to the Milan concert and offered the usual $150,000 
artist’s fee to the project.  Sting, Peter Gabriel and Sciuto taped a segment on the purpose 
of the tour that drew an overwhelming response.  Membership in Italy jumped from 8,000 
to 12,000 and several publishers volunteered to print AI’s annual report for the first time. 
 Activists or former political prisoners accompanying the tour or appearing at local 
venues also benefited from the celebrity spotlight.  At the press conference in Budapest, 
Hungary, Sciuto cited the historic nature of the concert.  First, the United Nations 
Association of Hungary endorsed the tour and printed 30,000 copies of the UDHR to be 
distributed at the concert.  Second, four days before the show, AI Secretary General Ian 
Martin was able to meet face-to-face with two representatives of the Hungarian 
government for the first time opening the way for AI investigative missions into the 
country.  Third, Hungarian rock stars Laslo Foldes and Janos Brody were able to share 
the concert stage with the tour’s stars.  The government in the past had censured both 
musicians.15 
 The India concert had proven problematic from the start.  With the Times of India 
as the concert’s local sponsor, the press was essentially covering itself.  They had been 
advertising the Delhi concert solely as a celebration of the newspaper’s 150th anniversary 
and had excluded AI representatives from the pre-concert press conference.  It was left to 
the artists to make clear that the concert was an AI event for human rights.  Furthermore, 
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in response to a reporter’s question, Peter Gabriel said the musicians were disgusted 
about the high ticket prices and the fact that the newspaper had only agreed to give the 
Concerts Foundation $50,000 of a potential gross of $1.2 million.  That said, Gabriel, 
Sting, and Springsteen stressed how pleased they were to be in the country that—through 
Gandhi—gave the world an example of non-violent human rights.  Despite the obstacles, 
all newspapers gave enormous positive coverage to the event and its message.16 
 
“Reference Publics/Civil Society” 
 Both AI activists and the artists wanted to take their message to places like 
Moscow, South Africa and Chile.  Efforts were made in some cases to gain permissions 
from government authorities to no avail.  The concerts in Budapest, Hungary and Harare, 
Zimbabwe were substitute locations that nonetheless sent a message.  The concert in 
Mendoza, Argentina fit the pattern better than the others.  Ariel Dorfman, the Chilean 
poet, had suggested Mendoza to Healey saying it was a frontier city where exiles had met 
for years.  Ultimately some 15,000 Chileans crossed the border to see the concert that 
included three local acts in addition to exiled Chilean activist Veronica De-Negri, whose 
son had been killed by Chilean security police. 
 It was the participation of members of the Association of Missing and Detained 
Persons of Chile, however that complicates the issue of representation.  Sting’s song 
“They Dance Alone” had become a kind of anthem for this group of mothers, sisters and 
daughters of those “disappeared” under the Pinochet regime.  A group of them came 
backstage to thank and serenade Sting at the Mendoza concert.  However, the group itself 
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was divided and when Sting invited 25 relatives of the “disappeared” to join him on stage 
they could not agree on who should go on.  In the end nearly 60 had to be disinvited.17 
 In a very real sense AI’s HRN! Campaign was not so much an effort to reach 
Lipsky’s reference public or third party, as it was an attempt to globally construct those 
entities.  Joel Pruce sees celebrities as a bridge between the West and the periphery.18  
That is, they can connect Western audiences to “faraway tragedies that seem remote.”19  
From Richard Rorty’s perspective they manipulate our feeling more than they expand our 
knowledge.  Sidney Tarrow contends there is no single core process leading to a global 
civil society or anything resembling one but there is a set of identifiable processes and 
mechanisms that intersect with domestic politics to produce differential paths of political 
change.20  Those paths include the struggle to create a space for the discussion of 
alternatives to state-centered and hierarchical global policy.  On the other hand, Saul 
Alinsky believed that protest’s ultimate goal was is build organization that can acquire 
stable political resources that don’t depend on third parties.21 
 Yet whether constructing a global civil society or a more resource rich protest 
organization, non-governmental organizations like AI are not necessarily more 
representative or accountable than elected governments.  Nor, as we see in Mendoza, do 
they operate from a cohesive moral universe.22  Pruce warns that celebrity-heavy appeals 
to diverse audiences will be managed by human rights organizations that will then dictate 
how and what manner victim groups are presented.23  While celebrities may help human 
rights organizations reach Western audiences, by directly representing the victims they 
weaken the connection to a human rights claim.  Local groups like the mother’s of the 
disappeared may be more democratic than many but garner less external assistance 
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because of internal strife.  Western NGOs often prefer to help groups with a strong, 
charismatic, English-speaking leader.24 
 David Kennedy goes further and argues, “the transformation of the First World 
media audience into an international community is an astonishing act of 
disenfranchisement.”25  It fosters an overwhelmingly one-way street criticism of the 
periphery by the center.  In addition, celebrities themselves bring significant incentives to 
shift movement frames toward the center and depoliticize or deradicalize movement 
claims.  David Meyer states that celebrities tend to make general collective claims about 
rights and tend to shape specific group claims into charity demands.26 
 The artists on the HRN! Tour were primarily attracted to the campaign by the 
opportunity to take their music and AI’s message to new audiences in countries they had 
never performed in before.  They were willing to play the usual venues in the Global 
North to subsidize taking two DC-10 airplanes filled with nearly 200 musicians, 
technicians and equipment to the Global South.  Springsteen, for example, remarked, 
“most of the audiences I draw in the U. S. are white.  In Harare, I had the first chance to 
play to an integrated audience.”27  Yet while racially diverse, the Harare audience was 
not as culturally or economically diverse as it might appear. 
 Approximately 20,000 South Africans journeyed North to Zimbabwe for the 
concert.  They joined roughly 50,000 Zimbabweans in a racially mixed crowd that was 60 
percent White.  And while Peter Gabriel emphasized that the concert represented rare 
opportunity to get the message in his song “Biko” out to those that could make a 
difference in South Africa, it does not change the elite nature of the concert audience. 
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 AI’s concert in Harare, like its concerts in all the non-Western venues, drew 
audiences composed of expatriates and Western educated elites.  This fact is not 
surprising given AI’s membership in the Global South.  In 1979, out of 2,305 registered 
AI groups worldwide, only 37 could be said to be from outside the West (including 15 in 
Japan).28  At the time of the HRN! Tour the chairperson of AI in Japan was an American 
expatriate, Edith Hanson, who became a popular TV actress there.  Moreover, the AI 
section coordinator in Japan pointed out that the organization’s focus on individual 
prisoners ran counter to Japanese culture’s emphasis on the collective.29  Even in the 
West, AI leadership was drawn from a limited demographic.  Whites from the Mainland, 
for example, led AIUSA’s group in Hawaii for years.  While in the short-term it was 
easiest for AI organizers to establish groups and sections largely composed of expatriates 
and elites, it often served as an obstacle to reaching the average citizen.30 
 The location of AI headquarters in London did not promote either membership or 
staff diversity.  In the decade following the concert tour the composition of AI staff from 
the West averaged over 76 percent with a plurality coming from the UK itself.  For years 
AI’s founder, Peter Benenson, argued for moving the headquarters to a neutral country.  
His efforts were unsuccessful and his primary motivation for relocating was political 
appearances not staff diversity.  Four of five of AI’s Secretary Generals from 1961 to 
1992 were British; the other was Swedish. 
 Perhaps the greatest obstacle to both staff and membership diversity was the 
organization’s “work on your own country” (WOOC) rule.  Simply stated the rule said 
sections could not work on prisoner cases in their own countries.  WOOC applied to staff 
and even IEC members.  The intent was not only to prevent real or apparent bias in AI 
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work but also to protect activists from retribution by governments that closely monitored 
the human rights activities of their citizens.  It is clear that in some countries AI would 
not have been permitted to operate if local groups had taken on local authorities.  By the 
1980s, however, it was apparent that the WOOC was severely constraining AI growth in 
developing countries as well as developed countries with substantial minority 
populations. 
 The type of audience attracted to AI’s rock concerts, however, highlighted a 
problem more fundamental than the WOOC.  When Peter Benenson founded AI in 1961 
he said the American civil rights movement influenced him.31  Led by student sit-ins, the 
civil rights movement grew rapidly throughout the South with sympathy protesters in the 
North.  Martin Luther King, Jr., helped turn a spotlight on the injustices suffered by 
Blacks in the South and many White Americans responded to the protests in Birmingham 
and Selma.  He led a movement that was Southern based and heavily influenced by 
Christianity.  King skillfully blended his Christian values with the country’s secular 
“American Creed” to appeal to citizen’s moral conscience.  When the movement shifted 
to the North, however, his moral suasion conflicted with the secular, Black Power politics 
of Northern Black activists and anti-war activists.  In addition, the White reference 
publics in the North that King had counted on in his protests against overt segregation in 
the South were less enthusiastic about confronting covert or de facto segregation in their 
own communities. 
 In Benenson’s vision, AI, through its research, highlighted injustices across the 
globe in the hope of moving citizens in the UK and elsewhere to act.  Their action was 
guided by the values found in the UDHR and gained additional moral legitimacy because 
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it was detached or disinterested.  That is, the human rights activists had nothing to gain 
personally from their action.32  In many ways, celebrities who depoliticize or 
deradicalize human rights claims while at the same time popularizing them were the 
perfect AI spokespersons. 
 This initial model of AI has been characterized as resembling a chapel or Quaker 
meetinghouse.33  Former AIUSA Board Chair James David Barber was fond of referring 
to members as worshipping at the alter of St. Amnesty.  Much of the action occurred in 
member’s kitchen tables as they wrote letters on remote cases to faraway governments.  
Richard Rorty has written that such notions as human rights are a function of our security 
and sympathy.  “Sentimental education,” he says, “only works on people who can relax 
long enough to listen.”34 
 Speaking truth to power, however, becomes complicated when deploying it for 
social change.  Moreover, the truth looses some of its authenticity when spoken by 
representatives of the victim rather than the victims themselves.  What happens when the 
victims seek to speak for themselves or when the issues raised are no longer remote but 
on you own doorstep? 
 The late 1980s represented an unprecedented opportunity for victims to speak for 
themselves.  With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Cold War drew to a close and 
activists in the Eastern Bloc emerged as new voices on the world stage.  Decolonization 
was nearly complete as the apartheid regime in South Africa was drawing its last breath.  
On the horizon, the women’s movement was claiming that women’s rights were also 
human rights culminating in a global UN conference in Beijing in 1995.  And while the 
 18 
HRN! Tour contributed information and energy to these developments; it did not lead to a 
major expansion of AI in the Global South.   
 Part of the reason for this failure was a lack of integration of the campaign with 
AI’s development arm.  The organization did create a Section Resource Group (SRG) 
whose main activity was to administer any surplus funds collected by the HRN! 
Development Fund.  Yet many sections were unaware of the SRGs existence.  The major 
mode of communication between the IS and sections during the tour was through 
“Human Rights Awareness Project” circulars.  Circular Number 1 announced the tour on 
July 27, 1987.  However, it was another four months before Circular Number 2 on 
November 13 explained the creation of the SRG.  In June 1988, the Danish section 
expressed concern about development follow-up and AIUSA was asked to contribute to 
the development fund. 
 Although there are organizational reasons for AI’s failure to capitalize fully from 
the tour’s publicity, perhaps the major reason is the development of local and national 
human rights organizations in the Global South.  In 1981 there were 220 organizations 
working on human rights and social justice in Latin America.  Less than a decade later 
there were 550 human rights groups in Latin America.  For example, Pepe Zalaquette, an 
exiled Chilean lawyer who was on the board of AIUSA in the 1970s and became chair of 
the IEC from 1979 to 1982, returned to Chile in 1986.  Moreover, AI was in competition 
with these local and national groups for scarce human right funding.  One Nigerian 
human rights activist complained that northern NGOs claim to represent southern groups 
making it impossible for local groups in the south to get funding, “[w]hy should we link 
hands?  Local NGOs cannot get support for their work so we have to affiliate with 
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international NGOs.  Then we all hold up our hands to the ‘gates of heaven.’  When the 
international NGOs arrive at the gate, they drop us and do the talking on our behalf.”35 
 
“Target Groups” 
 An internal IEC evaluation of the campaign indicated, “almost without exception 
sections who were visited by the tour or who had a broadcast of same witnessed an 
increase in interest and membership.”36  This was especially true in the smaller sections 
where AI was less well known among the general public.  Yet this awareness did not 
translate into a substantial increase in groups or sections in the Global South.  And, in 
fact, AI’s overall membership declined by roughly 24 percent in the 1990s.  Nor did the 
campaign have an immediate impact on governments.  “Few sections,” said the IEC,  
“reported any concrete steps being taken by their governments as a result of the 
campaign.”37   
 The major impact of the HRN! Tour was on the organization itself.  It served as a 
catalyst for changes that were already happening by bringing in a new generation of 
human rights activists.  Unlike Benenson and the early founders of AI, they were less 
ideological and less religious in their viewpoints.  Samuel Moyn states that Benenson saw 
AI as an alternative to socialism and by 1989 human rights rhetoric had replaced 
socialism as a progressive goal.  Yet by 1989, AI’s traditional detached, neutral, state-
centered approach to human rights was being challenged from within. 
 The 1987 ICM in Brazil just before the HRN! Campaign is a prime example of 
this changing culture.  Although there was an informational session on the forthcoming 
world rock tour, most of the key decisions for the campaign had already been made.  The 
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action in Brazil was focused on the identity-based issue of gay rights.  At the 1977 ICM a 
resolution passed stating that sexual orientation and behavior between consenting adults 
were legitimate grounds for POC status but by the time of the 1978 Mandate Committee 
a majority ruled that a person imprisoned “for sexual offenses alone does not fall within 
the AI terms of reference.”38  Even this position was too much for some developing 
sections that argued they would be closed down by their governments if AI were 
associated with gay rights.  There was also a lack of international legal support for a 
bolder mandate.  On the other hand, developed sections like the U. S. contended that it 
was hypocritical to defend the right of gays to speak but not to engage in sexual activity.  
In other words, “don’t practice what you preach.”  By the 1991 Yokohama ICM a 
compromised was reached in which the Statute was not changed but it was made clear 
that Amnesty would adopt people imprisoned because of homosexual acts or homosexual 
orientation as POCs.  The difficulty in stretching the mandate to cover this human right 
issue sparked a drive to expand the mandate more generally. 
 In 1985, AIUSA led a push for a Committee on Long-Range Organization 
Development (CLOD) whose objective was more internal democracy and a greater 
openness to the human rights movement as a whole.  CLOD issued a final report at the 
Brazil ICM focused on growth outside the West.  During this period, AIUSA itself fought 
over dedicating special attention to the rights of women and minorities.  Traditionalists 
argued that no special efforts should be made while reformers believed the rights of 
certain groups were overlooked.  Moreover, AI needed to devote more attention to human 
rights violations in developed sections such as the U. S. both because they existed and to 
avoid the appearance of human rights imperialism. 
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  Moyn argues that the rise of identity based politics in the 1970s that “struggled 
for recognition of identities beyond those of white males challenged the narrow terms of 
established welfare states, but only in the age of state retrenchment and redistributive 
failure.”39  According to Moyn, this led to a breakthrough in status equality but at the 
expense of material equality. 
 Moyn is critical of AI and the human rights movement in general because it 
promotes a legal culture that pushes politics aside and accepts subsistence or basic rights 
in place of material equality.  The UDHR was largely irrelevant to anti-colonialism, says 
Moyn, and does not mention the right to strike or the right to welfare.  This makes the 
human rights movement’s minimal demands for individual subsistence perfectly 
compatible with the rise of neoliberalism; a neoliberalism that replaces calls for global 
justice with market fundamentalism.40 
 Much of Moyn’s critique rings true when discussing AI’s early development.  It is 
too simplistic, however, to say that human rights are Western values imposed on the rest 
of the world or that identity-based movements have given up the struggle for global 
justice.  Steven Jensen reminds us that international human rights law has been built on a 
foundation of race.  The notion of equality was a major reason for the Global South 
emphasizing human rights and it was the nine Francophone African states that presented 
a resolution calling for a Convention of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1962.  
In addition, Jensen credits Jamaica, Ghana, the Philippines, Liberia and other for teaching 
international human rights diplomacy to Eastern and Western actors embroiled in the 
Cold War.  Jamaica’s labor struggle, for example, was connected though Norman Manly 
to the International League for the Rights of Man as early as 1954.41  Moyn’s lamenting 
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of the passing of calls for global justice from socialist and global welfare perspectives 
ignores the limits gender, race and identity in general played in their demise.42  He also 
avoids defining what “material equality” means.  From an organizational perspective it is 
much easier to determine which citizens are denied a vote or who is subjected to torture, 
than to decide what level of material equality beyond subsistence is required.  In short, 
identity groups are self-defined whereas classes seldom are. 
 On December 12, 1988, AI –represented by Sciuto, Sting, Gabriel and N’Dour—
delivered over 400,000 signatures on a petition collected at the concerts to the UN in 
Geneva.  The petition was an appeal to the UN to promote public awareness of the 
UDHR and its two primary covenants on political and civil rights (ICCPR) and 
economic, social and cultural rights (ICESCR).  UN leaders were more like partners in an 
alliance rather than a target group in welcoming the petition.  Senegalese Ambassador 
Sene and UN Under-Secretary General for Human Rights Jan Martenson received it in a 
ceremony at the 44th UN Human Rights Commission meeting.  The warm welcome was 
no surprise as UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar had expressed his support 
for the tour in March 1988.  However, a more specific objective of the campaign was to 
pressure the UN and governments to do more to protect human rights defenders.  Toward 
that end the HRN! Campaign highlighted cases of human rights defenders in China, 
Kenya, Ukraine, Colombia and El Salvador.  The protection of human rights defenders 
remained an AI priority and some then years after the concerts the UN General Assembly 





 It is impossible to know the extent to which the concerts motivated those who 
attended them in person or viewed them on television to act.  Certainly the AI sections 
that were in a position to follow-up on the concerts added new funds and resources.  Yet 
the more significant impact of the campaign, as stated earlier was on the organization 
itself. 
 As Franca Sciuto said in her opening statement at the press conference 
announcing the tour on December 9, 1987, [w]hat we need is a new generation – a human 
rights generation—to move into the 1990s and then the 21st century fired by the 
determination to see the promise of human rights made real in our time.”43  The Finnish 
section put the question that would be raised by this new generation forth: “do our current 
techniques actually appeal to young persons?”44 
 The answer was a resounding no!  Young activists were more attracted to 
Healey’s campaigning style than traditional AI casework.  IEC members seemed to sense 
this when they asked Healey and AIUSA for another world concert proposal in early 
1991.  The focus was to be a campaign on women’s rights to mark the 30th anniversary 
of AI’s founding.  Although the concert schedule would not be as long as HRN! It would 
include Australia and South Africa.  Artists were particularly keen to play South Africa 
but there were major obstacles.  The African National Congress (ANC) had declared a 
cultural boycott of South Africa and any concert would require an exemption.  There was 
also the problem of who could afford to attend such a concert since AI was not seeking 
corporate sponsorship for this tour.  Everyone remembered the HRN! Concert in 
Zimbabwe had drawn mostly Whites.  Finally, AI was well aware that it lacked the 
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infrastructure in South Africa to follow-up any concert.  While all of these issues were 
being discussed the Gulf War was unfolding.  This development raised new security 
concerns.  Ultimately the world tour idea and even a shorter regional tour in Southern 
Africa were rejected.45 
 While another world concert tour was not deemed feasible, major changes were 
occurring in the organization itself.  The influx of younger members spurred changes 
already underway as those members coming of age in the 1950s and 1960s assumed 
leadership positions.  In 1992 Pierre Sane, a Senegalese, replaced Ian Martin as Secretary 
General.  Sane challenged the research culture of AI and integrated the once dominant 
research department into other units in 1994.  He also sought to make managers rather 
than researchers the key decision makers.46 
 AI’s first female Secretary General, Bangladeshi lawyer Irene Kahn, replaced 
Sane in 2001.  Kahn pushed AI to focus more attention on global poverty as a human 
rights concern.  In 2004, she initiated AI’s global campaign to stop violence against 
women.  Sahil Shelty took over as Secretary General in 2010.  An Indian human rights 
activist, Shelty made the controversial decision to decentralize the IS by opening ten new 
regional “hubs” to get closer to the place where human rights violations were happening.  
AI’s current Secretary General is Kumi Naidoo, a South African who was living in the 
UK as a young exile at the time of the concert tour.  He returned to South Africa to work 
with the ANC in 1990 and came to AI from his position as Executive Director of 
Greenpeace.   
 This diversification of the geographical and experiential backgrounds of AI 
leadership would have been impossible without major changes in AI’s mandate and 
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culture.  A watershed moment occurred at the 2001 ICM in Dakar, Senegal, when 
delegates voted to replace the term mandate with the less legalistic concept of mission.  
They then proceeded to scrap the WOOC rule that had delegitimized those members 
whose expertise came from experience.47  This opened the organization to grassroots 
activists in the Global South as well as North. 
 The 2003 Mexico ICM also witnessed a conflict between the old and new AI over 
the issue of AI support for UN troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  AI had 
never taken a decision on troop deployments.  Members not only voted in favor of UN 
support but also for working on nuclear weapons testing, children’s rights, AIDS and 
violence against women.  Today the mandate covers work on refugee/migrant rights, 
indigenous/minority rights and sexual/reproductive rights.  Stephen Hopgood has 
characterized the shift from moral authority to political authority, “the mandate was a 
self-validating core practice, and AI was what it did…once it began to move away from 
this solitary figure without social content toward issues in which there was more 
politics—gay rights, women’s rights, economic rights—it was choosing sides.”48 
 AI has not abandoned celebrity politics.  It has incorporated them through the 
Secretary General’s Global Council that includes such figures as Richard Branson, Paulo 
Coelho and Yoko Ono among others.  Nor has it abandoned rock concerts.  In 2014 it 
sponsored human rights concerts in Brooklyn featuring Pussy Riot.  Instead of a Concerts 
Foundation, AI now has a charity fund, AI Charity Limited that allows the central 
organization to accept legacy gifts and other one-off donations.  In turn, AICL distributes 
the funds through a grant making process. 
 26 
 The HRN! Tour represented a rare opportunity to examine the construction of a 
global civil society by the largest transnational human right organization utilizing a major 
popular culture spectacle.  No event of this size or duration promoting human rights 
education has been attempted since.  Lipsky’s theoretical framework provided a heuristic 
instrument in looking at what was achieved. 
 We found the impact of the tour on the organization was the most significant 
outcome.  Although the HRN! Tour was not AI’s first campaign to break away from its 
individual case approach—that was the 1973 Campaign Against Torture (CAT)—it was 
the first to challenge the dominance of researchers at the IS and led to the structural 
realignment of AI headquarters.  It also led to the decentralization of some decision-
making as sections sought more input into the HRN! Campaign.  Finally, it demanded a 
rethinking of how AI raised money.  Pushed by the U. S. section, the organization moved 
away form a “bake sale” model of funding to consider corporate sponsorships.  The deal 
with Reebok was earthshaking in its consequences as sections sought innovative ways of 
raising funds and Reebok decided to form its own foundation.49  The combination of 
these actions produced a transformation of AI’s traditional culture. 
 Given the status of the artists on the concert tour, communicating AI’s human 
rights message proved the least problematic part of the campaign.  Still it raised the 
question of who represented AI.  As what some have called “powerless elites” celebrities 
have greater access to decision-makers raising the question of to what extent they can 
represent victim groups.  Some with in the organization questioned whether rock music 
was a culturally insensitive vehicle to promote human rights.  The campaign’s 
incorporation of local musicians partially addressed this issue and the tour itself went 
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only to locations proposed by the sections.  There was no attempt by the artists 
themselves to deradicalize or depoliticize AI’s already general message of support for the 
UDHR.  In fact, it was the medium and the message in songs like “They Dance Alone” 
and “Biko” that energized the audiences.  Concerts can be seen as counter-public spaces 
that foster identity-based publicization of oppositional discourses.  Even in the age of 
social media where online spaces are more open, they have less influence and a shorter 
life span than concert spectacles.50 
 AI’s primary objective for the concert tour was human rights education, not 
fundraising.  By taking awareness of the UDHR to the Global South, AI was building a 
kind of reference public or third party that would support human rights work and human 
rights activists.  Yet the very generation of young people AI was hoping to attract was 
beginning to raise questions about the universality of human rights.  Some feminists, for 
example, were questioning to what extent the idea of universalism was a product of 
White, Western men.51  And some in the Global South saw human rights as a one-way 
street in which the West lectured them on morality and promoted individualism.  In short, 
some saw it as a form of neo-imperialism.52 
 HRN! served as a catalyst for rethinking the AI model.  If AI wanted to grow 
globally it would have to change—it would have to take sides.  No longer could it remain 
the detached and neutral generator of information that people used to write polite letters 
to government officials asking them to uphold universal ideals.  Not only would AI have 
to switch to a more immediate campaign style approach to its work, it would also have to 
expand its mandate.  As it did so it attracted activists and leaders from outside the West 
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who focused on such issues as global poverty, women’s rights and minority rights.  In a 





1988 HUMAN RIGHTS NOW! TOUR ITINERARY 
 
 
September 2   London, England 
 
September 4   Paris, France 
 
September 5   Paris, France 
 
September 6    Budapest, Hungary 
 
September 8    Turin, Italy 
 
September 10   Barcelona, Spain 
 
September 13   San Jose, Costa Rica 
 
September 15   Toronto, Canada 
 
September 17   Montreal, Canada 
 
September 19   Philadelphia, USA 
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September 21   Los Angles, USA 
 
September 23   Oakland, USA 
 
September 27   Tokyo, Japan 
 
September 30   Delhi, India 
 
October 3   Athens, Greece 
 
October 7   Harare, Zimbabwe 
 
October 9   Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire 
 
October 12   San Paolo, Brazil 
 
October 14   Mendoza, Argentina 
 
October 15   Buenos Aires, Argentina 
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